Za deskriptivní zooetiku - A Plea for Descriptive Zooethics
Obsah hlavního článku
Abstrakt
Abstrakt: Tento článek předkládá základní kontury „deskriptivní etiky zvířat“ založené na experimentálním studiu našich intuic ohledně určitých konkrétních situací, ve snaze určit, které morální teorie nejlépe odpovídají těmto intuicím. Navrhuji, že intuice nemusí být nevěrohodné, neboť je lze chápat jako zvážené soudy. I kdyby byly nevěrohodné, bude naše znalost těchto intuic zdrojem informací pro etickou teorii jednání morálních aktérů. Popisuji dotazníkový výzkum v oblasti deskriptivní etiky, diskutuji výsledky a zavádím prospektivní experimenty. Posléze předkládám hypotézy a navrhuji duální model přisouzení morálního statusu založený na vnitřních a vnějších vlastnostech. Vycházím ze současných empirických výzkumů v psychologii a experimentální filosofii, které srovnávám se svými výsledky. Model předpovídá, že přisouzení morálního statusu se mění v závislosti na schopnostech subjektů, kontextu (včetně vztahů) a kontextu, v němž se nachází ten, kdo morální status přisuzuje. Docházím k závěru, že tato data deskriptivní etiky mají přímou relevanci pro normativní etiku v té míře, v níž náš kognitivní aparát omezuje naši schopnost morálního jednání. Naznačují také způsoby, jak vylepšit naší morální percepci, výchovu a motivace.
Abstract: This article outlines a “descriptive animal ethics” based on the study of people’s intuitions about particular cases, in order to determine which moral theories best comport with those intuitions. I suggest that the latter need not be unreliable since they may be endorsed as considered judgments, and that even if they were, knowing them would still provide relevant information for a complete moral theory concerned with what moral agents can do. I describe a survey in descriptive ethics, discuss the results, and introduce prospective experiments. I then set forth hypotheses and propose a dual model of moral status attribution in terms of both intrinsic and extrinsic properties. I rely on recent empirical research in psychology and experimental philosophy, which I confront with the above results, to support my hypotheses. The model predicts that attributions vary depending on the capacities of entities, their context (including relationships), and the context of the attributor. These facts of descriptive ethics, I conclude, are directly relevant to normative ethics insofar as our cognitive apparatus constrains our ability to act morally. Moreover, they suggest ways to improve moral perception, education, and motivation.
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